What's new arround internet
| Src | Date (GMT) | Titre | Description | Tags | Stories | Notes |
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2022-08-06 10:46:21 | CISO workshop slides (lien direct) | A glossy, nicely-constructed and detailed PowerPoint slide deck by Microsoft Security caught my beady this morning. The title 'CISO Workshop: Security Program and Strategy' with 'Your Name Here' suggests it might be a template for use in a workshop/course bringing CISOs up to speed on the governance, strategic and architectural aspects of information security, but in fact given the amount of technical detail, it appears to be aimed at informing IT/technology managers about IT or cybersecurity, specifically. Maybe it is intended for newly-appointed CISOs or more junior managers who aspire to be CISOs, helping them clamber up the pyramid (slide 87 of 142): | Malware Vulnerability Threat Patching Guideline Medical Cloud | Uber APT 38 APT 37 APT 28 APT 19 APT 15 APT 10 APT 34 Guam | |
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2022-05-03 16:31:00 | Anomali Cyber Watch: Time-to-Ransom Under Four Hours, Mustang Panda Spies on Russia, Ricochet Chollima Sends Goldbackdoor to Journalists, and More (lien direct) | The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: APT, China, Cyberespionage, LNK files, Malspam, North Korea, Phishing, Ransomware, and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
A Lookback Under the TA410 Umbrella: Its Cyberespionage TTPs and Activity
(published: April 28, 2022)
ESET researchers found three different teams under China-sponsored umbrella cyberespionage group TA410, which is loosely linked to Stone Panda (APT10, Chinese Ministry of State Security). ESET named these teams FlowingFrog, JollyFrog, and LookingFrog. FlowingFrog uses the Royal Road RTF weaponizer described by Anomali in 2019. Infection has two stages: the Tendyron implant followed by a very complex FlowCloud backdoor. JollyFrog uses generic malware such as PlugX and QuasarRAT. LookingFrog’s infection stages feature the X4 backdoor followed by the LookBack backdoor. Besides using different backdoors and exiting from IP addresses located in three different districts, the three teams use similar tools and similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Analyst Comment: Organizations should keep their web-facing applications such as Microsoft Exchange or SharePoint secured and updated. Educate your employees on handling suspected spearphishing attempts. Defense-in-depth (layering of security mechanisms, redundancy, fail-safe defense processes) is the best way to ensure safety from APTs, including a focus on both network and host-based security. Prevention and detection capabilities should also be in place.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Exploit Public-Facing Application - T1190 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Phishing - T1566 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Native API - T1106 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Shared Modules - T1129 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Exploitation for Client Execution - T1203 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Inter-Process Communication - T1559 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Windows Management Instrumentation - T1047 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Scheduled Task - T1053 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Server Software Component - T1505 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Create or Modify System Process - T1543 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Masquerading - T1036 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Masquerading - T1036 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Rootkit - T1014 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Process Injection - T1055 | |
Ransomware Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Guideline Cloud | APT 37 APT 10 APT 10 | |
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2021-07-06 15:05:00 | Anomali Cyber Watch: Thousands attacked as REvil ransomware hijacks Kaseya VSA, Leaked Babuk Locker Ransomware Builder Used In New Attacks and More (lien direct) | The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: Babuk, IndigoZebra, Ransomware, REvil, Skimmer, Zero-day and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
Shutdown Kaseya VSA Servers Now Amidst Cascading REvil Attack Against MSPs, Clients
(published: July 4, 2021)
A severe ransomware attack reportedly took place against the popular remote monitoring and management (RMM) software tool Kaseya VSA. On July 2, 2021, Kaseya urged users to shut down their VSA servers to prevent them from being compromised. The company estimated that fewer than 40 of their customers worldwide were affected, but as some of them were managed service providers (MSPs), over 1,000 businesses were infected. The majority of known victims are in the US with some in Europe (Sweden) and New Zealand. The attackers exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Kaseya’s systems that the company was in the process of fixing. It was part of the administrative interface vulnerabilities in tools for system administration previously identified by Wietse Boonstra, a DIVD researcher. The REvil payload was delivered via Kaseya software using a custom dropper that dropped two files. A dropper opens an old but legitimate copy of Windows Defender (MsMpEng.exe) that then side loads and executes the custom malicious loader's export. The attack coincided with the start of the US Independence Day weekend, and has several politically-charged strings, such as “BlackLivesMatter” Windows registry key and “DTrump4ever” as a password.
Analyst Comment: Kaseya VSA clients should safely follow the company’s recommendations as it advised shutting Kaseya VSA servers down, and is making new security updates available. Every organization should have a ransomware disaster recovery plan even if it is serviced by a managed service provider (MSP).
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Data Encrypted for Impact - T1486 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Supply Chain Compromise - T1195 | [MITRE ATT&CK] DLL Side-Loading - T1073
Tags: REvil, Sodinokibi, Gandcrab, Leafroller, Kaseya VSA, ransomware, Ransomware-as-a- Service, zero-day, CVE-2021-30116, supply-chain, North America, USA, Sweden, New Zealand, MSP, RMM, schools
IndigoZebra APT Continues To Attack Central Asia With Evolving Tools
(published: July 1, 2021)
Researchers from Check Point have identified the Afghan Government as the latest victim in a cyber espionage campaign by the suspected Chinese group ‘IndigoZebra’. This attack began in April when Afghan National Security Council (NSC) officials began to receive lure emails claiming to be from the President’s secretariat. These emails included a decoy file that would install the backdoor ‘BoxCaon’ on the system before reaching out to the Dropbox API to act as a C&C server. The attacker would then be able to fingerprint the machine and begin accessing files. I |
Ransomware Spam Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Guideline | APT 19 APT 10 | |
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2021-04-06 16:57:00 | Anomali Cyber Watch: APT Groups, Data Breach, Malspam, and More (lien direct) | The various threat intelligence stories in this iteration of the Anomali Cyber Watch discuss the following topics: APT10, Charming Kitten, China, Cycldek, Hancitor, Malspam, North Korea, Phishing, TA453, and Vulnerabilities. The IOCs related to these stories are attached to Anomali Cyber Watch and can be used to check your logs for potential malicious activity.
Figure 1 - IOC Summary Charts. These charts summarize the IOCs attached to this magazine and provide a glimpse of the threats discussed.
Trending Cyber News and Threat Intelligence
The Leap of a Cycldek-Related Threat Actor
(published: April 5, 2021)
A new sophisticated Chinese campaign was observed between June 2020 and January 2021, targeting government, military and other critical industries in Vietnam, and, to lesser extent, in Central Asia and Thailand. This threat actor uses a "DLL side-loading triad" previously mastered by another Chinese group, LuckyMouse: a legitimate executable, a malicious DLL to be sideloaded by it, and an encoded payload, generally dropped from a self-extracting archive. But the code origins of the new malware used on different stages of this campaign point to a different Chinese-speaking group, Cycldek.
Analyst Comment: Malware authors are always innovating new methods of communicating back to the control servers. Always practice Defense in Depth (do not rely on single security mechanisms - security measures should be layered, redundant, and failsafe).
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] DLL Side-Loading - T1073 | [MITRE ATT&CK] File Deletion - T1107
Tags: Chinese-speaking, Cycldek-related
Hancitor’s Use of Cobalt Strike and a Noisy Network Ping Tool
(published: April 1, 2021)
Hancitor is an information stealer and malware downloader used by a threat actor designated as MAN1, Moskalvzapoe or TA511. Initial infection includes target clicking malspam, then clicking on a link in an opened Google Docs page, and finally clicking to enable macros in the downloaded Word document. In recent months, this actor began using a network ping tool to help enumerate the Active Directory (AD) environment of infected hosts. It generates approximately 1.5 GB of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) traffic.
Analyst Comment: Organizations should use email security solutions to block malicious/spam emails. All email attachments should be scanned for malware before they reach the user's inbox. IPS rules need to be configured properly to identify any reconnaissance attempts e.g. port scan to get early indication of potential breach.
MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Remote System Discovery - T1018 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Remote Access Tools - T1219 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Rundll32 - T1085 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Standard Application Layer Protocol - T1071 | [MITRE ATT&CK] System Information Discovery - T1082
Tags: Hancitor, Malspam, Cobalt Strike
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Malware Tool Vulnerability Threat Conference | APT 35 APT 10 | |
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2019-01-31 17:24:00 | APT10 Group Targets Multiple Sectors, But Seems to Really Love MSSPs (lien direct) |
Threat Actors That Don’t Discriminate
When it comes to threat actors and the malware variants they use, let’s talk dating — or rather, the way people date — because one could argue there are marked similarities between the two. You see, there are criminal groups who have a “type,” i.e. using malware that targets specific industries or even organizations — say, financial services (ever-popular and oh-so debonair) or perhaps critical infrastructure (spicy and daring!), or even healthcare for those who prefer staid and demure. Yet other groups are the free lovin’ types who go after multiple sectors using many different malware variants and approaches to accomplish their goal — no discriminating with this bunch.
Let’s look at one such example, APT10 / Cloud Hopper, which is likely the group behind a long running, sophisticated campaign that uses multiple malware variants to target many different sectors in many different countries. You can check out some of the pulses relating to APT10 / Cloud Hopper on the Open Threat Exchange (OTX).
The U.S. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) reports the campaign started in May 2016, and NCCIC last updated its alert in December 2018 — so it’s not going away yet.
The group known as APT10 / Cloud Hopper has hit quite a few victims over the last few years in many different sectors, such as: information technology, energy, healthcare and public health, communications, and critical manufacturing. However, their “date of choice” seems to be MSSPs due to the fact a that credential compromises within those networks could potentially be leveraged to access customer environments. From OTX pulse “Operation Cloud Hopper”:
The espionage campaign has targeted managed IT service providers (MSSPs), allowing the APT10 group unprecedented potential access to the intellectual property and sensitive data of those MSSPs and their clients globally. This indirect approach of reaching many through only a few targets demonstrates a new level of maturity in cyber espionage – so it’s more important than ever to have a comprehensive view of all the threats your organization might be exposed to, either directly or through your supply chain.
As any clever serial dater would do, APT10 / Cloud Hopper doesn’t use just one approach. The NCCIC reports they have deployed multiple malware families and variants, some of which are currently not detected by anti-virus signatures — for example, PLUGX / SOGU and REDLEAVES. And although the observed malware is based on existing malware code, APT10 / Cloud Hopper modifies it to improve effectiveness and avoid detection by existing signatures.
How Can APT10 Group Impact You?
If these free lovin’ bad guys decide to come after you, they’re likely looking for your data (perhaps to steal intellectual property). At a high level, they’re accomplishing this by leveraging stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and certificates to place sophisticated malware implants on critical systems (such as PlugX and Redleaves). Depending on the defensive mitigations in place, they then gain full access to networks and data in a way that appears legitimate to existing your monitoring tools. Voila! They’ve gone from first date to a home run!
Wired Maga |
Malware Vulnerability Threat | APT 10 |
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